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Asbstract
The radical  changes in the concepts and approach in Physics at the turn of  the Nineteenth
century were so deep, that is acknowledged as a “revolution”. However, in 1970 Thomas Kuhn's
careful  reconstruction  of  the  researches  on the  black  body problem,  the  concept  itself  of  the
“revolution” seemed to vanish in his diluted discussion of every details.
In the present paper, after an examination of the limitations of Kuhn's response to his critics, I
put forward the idea – although it is not new – that these changes in Physics cannot be reduced to
a “point-like” event, but happened instead through multiple successive (and even contradictory)
changes  in  the  course  of  decades.  Such  as  the  “old”  quantum  hypothesis,  wave  mechanics,
“orthodox” quantum mechanics. In fact, the innovative perspectives started in the 1980s have been
considered as a “third quantum revolution”.
My basic argument is that these changes, in order to be really understood, must be interpreted
not as mere specific changes in Physics, but framed in the context of the deep social, cultural, and
economic changes during those turbulent years. The main steps are outlined.
The concept that at the beginning of the Twentieth century physics underwent a deep
“revolution” in its foundations and basic concepts is largely acknowledged both in the
scientific and the philosophical-historical communities. Even the basic textbooks of
physics adopt this concept, although they usually present a stereotyped  a posteriori
“rational” reconstruction, which misrepresents the true genesis and development of
the new concepts. On the other side, an enormous quantity of detailed and rigorous
studies has been produced on the subject in the past decades, which has brought a
deep  advancement  in  the  reconstruction  and  interpretation  of  the  scientific  and
epistemological contributions of the main scientists. Nevertheless, such a tremendous
quantity of information has not resolved, rather has deepened, the controversies on the
interpretation and the exact identification of this “revolution”.
The concept of  scientific revolutions was introduced in a famous book by Thomas
Kuhn (1970), in which the concept of paradigm was also proposed. However, when
Kuhn  successively  presented  the  most  careful  and  detailed  reconstruction  of  the
researches on the black body problem at the turn of the Nineteenth century (Kuhn
1978), the concept itself of the “revolution” seemed to vanish in his diluted discussion
of every details. This remark was raised by several scholars (Klein, Shimony, and
Pinch 1979; Needell 1980; Galison 1981; Darrigol 1991, 1992; Jost 1995; Gearhart
2002),  and  Kuhn  replied  proposing  in  practice  a  “point  localization”  of  the
“revolution” (Kuhn 1982, 1984). In the development of the controversy, a firm point
is  the  analysis  by  Büttner,  Renn  and  Schemmel  (2003),  based  on  Einstein’s
correspondence with his fiancée Milena Maric, to which we refer for more details (not
to speak of previous papers, and the whole critical edition of Einstein’s papers by
Renn).
In the present paper we argue that a complementary point of view and reconstruction
can greatly help in getting a deeper, or wider, insight into the process of scientific
development  and innovation.  We will  resume the  main  arguments,  specifying  the
basic considerations.1 We will start with a critical consideration of Kuhn’s concepts,
and the concept itself of “scientific revolution”.
1. On the concept of “scientific revolution”
In  our  opinion,  several  criticisms  can  be  moved  to  the  concept  of  “scientific
revolution” as proposed by Kuhn.
1) Kuhn´s  concept  of  “scientific  revolution”  is  too  generic,  in  some sense  even
abstract. Although at first sight the change in paradigms appears quite clear (e.g., the
turn from classical to quantum theory), when a deeper analysis is developed it appears
not so easy to identify and pinpoint the change, its nature and substance: it seems just
what emerges in the controversies on the quantum “revolution”. The point is that there
is no clear-cut criterion for identifying the change. On the one side, the evaluation of
the change of paradigm strongly depends on personal appreciation. On the other side,
when the reconstruction of the developments of the physical concepts is carried out in
great details, resorting to private correspondence or documents of the scientists, even
psychological aspects enter into play (if not psychoanalytical ones, as for instance in
the case of the relationship between Pauli and Jung).
Obviously, the rigorous reconstruction of the evolution of science in every details,
having recourse to every document that can throw light into the process of scientific
elaboration  and  creation,  brings  fundamental  contributions  for  understanding  the
development of science. Our point is that this analysis in deep should be performed
having some general criterion for placing and interpreting the specific developments.
Otherwise, what does really represent every change in the conceptions of a scientist
for the general evolution of science? How many, even deeply creative, changes in
scientific conceptions did happen, and can be singled out in the thought of scientists,
which had no concrete influence in the development of science? What determines that
an innovative idea results in a change in science? Not all the discarded ideas were
wrong; sometimes they were only premature: but why?
2) Kuhn´s  concept  of  “scientific  revolution”  is  at  the  same time  too  restricted.
Scientific changes do not have a unique, “point-like” origin and meaning, uniquely
determining all  subsequent  scientific  developments.  As  an  example,  when  models
were introduced in physics and chemistry after mid Nineteenth century, this happened
in several ways, and with successive changes, which were not merely implicit in the
early  idea.  Actually,  models had  been  proposed  even  earlier,  but  had  not  been
generally  accepted by the scientific  community as general tools:  which conditions
were  necessary  for  their  general  acceptance  and  adoption?  Moreover,  during  the
1850s  models were introduced  independently in  physics  and in  chemistry.  Finally,
these early models evolved in substantial,  and unforeseen, ways in the subsequent
decades,  originating  general  scientific  theories.  This  “revolution”  was  instead  a
process.
In a similar way, the Twentieth century “revolution” in physics did not originate in a
unique  hypothesis,  but  involved  different  disciplines,  and  underwent  a  long
development,  through successive and unforeseen changes.  The theory of relativity
was a “revolution”, not implicit in, but connected with, the “quantum” one. And, in
this respect, why the previous relevant contributions of Lorentz and Poincare did not
resort in a new theory? The “revolution” in physics cannot be reduced, in time and
1 This approach and interpretation was proposed in an early essay (Baracca, Ruffo and Russo 1979), in
Italian, and resumed and extended for this specific subject in 2005 (Baracca 2005).
space, to some new concept introduced in 1900 or in 1905, or somewhere in between
(be it due to Planck or Einstein). It was instead a  process, a long and very complex
one,  which  covered  a  quarter  of  a  century.  The elaboration  of  orthodox quantum
mechanics at mid 1920s was not implicit in the 1900-revolution, it rather introduced a
really new paradigm. Otherwise, one could not understand why Einstein, who was (at
least one of) the main authors of the Twentieth century “revolution”, was so hostile
towards the successive evolution of the theory in the 1920s. In our view (as we will
clarify  in  the  following),  both  Planck  and Einstein  introduced  in  the  early  1900s
fundamental,  and  independent,  pieces  of  changes  which  contributed  to  the  early
quantum  framework:  and  which  were  overcome  by  (substantially  incompatible)
transformations of mid 1920s.
3) On the general concept of “revolution”, one should consider that every kind of,
however  radical,  social  change is  not  a  sudden and localized historical  event,  but
rather a process. The French Revolution cannot be restricted to the events of 1789, as
if the subsequent transformations were implicit in the first changes: it was instead a
long lasting process, starting off new and original innovations, whose early seed was
moreover  not  suddenly  thrown  in  1789,  but  long  prepared  not  only  by  previous
transformations  in  France,  but  also  by  foreign  influences  (like  the  Enlightenment
movement  directly  inspired  to  the  English  example).  Similarly,  the  Bolshevik
Revolution was not an event restricted to October of 1917, which could not prescind
from previous movements and attempts, and threw a seed that was to produce  new
and unpredictable transformations.
4) Production of science is a social activity, deeply intertwined with the whole social
environment, its contradictions, cultural currents and traditions, the specific role of
scientists and the organization of scientific activity (with national peculiarities), up to
the hard economic and technological demands, choices and transformations, including
the advancements in  experimental techniques.  It  is  a fact  that  when deep changes
happen in science, they usually go along with deep changes not only in the social role
of scientists and in the way they conceive and carry out their profession (which is not
a  purely  scientific aspect),  but  also  with  deep  changes  in  culture,  in  society,  in
technology, in economy. In the majority of cases one finds out common, or parallel,
features in all (or in several of) these areas. The consideration of these connections,
and of the more general social context, can throw a deeper light into each of these
areas, and in particular can help in judging and placing the conditions in which new
scientific  concepts  and  hypotheses  arise,  and  allow  them  to  overcome  previous
conceptions  and  methods,  and  to  grow  into  new  scientific  “paradigms”  and
methodological frameworks.
An enlightening comparison is in our opinion D. S. Landes’ reconstruction of the
technological  changes  and  industrial  development  in  Europe  (Landes  1965):  it
represents a true  social history of technology, in which those technological changes
that in other,  even more detailed,  histories of technology appear as simply due to
individual inventiveness or talent or cumulative skills, acquire a deeper meaning and
justification in connection with the social and economic changes and requirements.
The  industrial  revolutions  were  processes,  which  did  not  originate  in  a  single
innovation,  but were molded in the course of decades under the incentive of new
economic and technical needs, through the multiple introduction of innovations and
their successive improvements, which often introduced substantial innovations (for
instance,  for  steam  power  was  the  “crucial”  invention  Savery´s  engine  of  1698,
Newcomen´s engine of 1712, or Watt’s invention of 1769?). Why should things go in
a different way for scientific innovations?
Not differently, the above mentioned process of the introduction and development of
models in physics and chemistry in the second half of the 19th century can be most
properly understood and interpreted making substantial  reference to the social  and
economic  conditions  and  requirements  for  changes  in  economy,  in  industry,  in
science, in education, in culture (Baracca, Ruffo and Russo 1979).
We are fully aware of the danger of confusing simple associations, and analogies in
different  fields  for  a  causal connection.  We  maintain,  however,  that  a  definite
historical  situation  stimulates,  or  generates,  innovations  (both  practical  and
intellectual), conceptual frameworks, new trends and concepts, which show concrete
similarities, much deeper than what we can discuss in the present concise survey; and
that – even apart from direct connections (which nevertheless in many cases can be
demonstrated)  –  they  provide  a  more  complete,  understandable  and  convincing
reconstruction of the evolution of science and its deep changes.
5) By  the  way,  let  us  briefly  mention  one  more  advantage  that  we  see  in  the
approach  we  are  proposing,  referred  to  the  popularization  of  science.  This  is  an
extremely  demanding  problem,  since  one  cannot  obviously  pretend  that  common
people masters the formal content of modern science. Even the students of physics
meet some difficulty against modern theories only on the basis of formalisms. We
deem that reference to the general historical context, the technological changes, the
cultural and intellectual currents, the changing social role of scientists, the material
transformations and requirements posed by the social and economic environment, can
greatly help common people to catch the reasons, and also the specific basic features,
of the scientific approaches to natural phenomena and their physical representations.
On  the  basis  of  the  previous  considerations,  let  us  briefly  summarize  how  the
revolution  (or  revolutions?)  in  physics  (and  not  only)  in  the  first  quarter  of  the
Twentieth  century  can  be  interpreted.  In  spite  of  our  previous  criticism,  we  will
continue to use the word “revolution”, however we consider more appropriate and
unambiguous to  use in  many (even fundamental)  aspects  such words  as  turns,  or
turning points,  in the reconstruction of a whole and complex  process of scientific
change.
2.  Nineteenth  century  prodromes  and  anticipations  of  the  Twentieth  century
scientific revolution in physics
2.1. The contradictions of the physicists at the end of the Nineteenth century
In  the  last  decades  of  the  19th century  the  situation  in  physics  appears  deeply
contradictory.  The  “paradoxes”  which  plagued  the  big  19th century  theories  were
actually only the epi-phenomenon of a deep contradiction. Indeed, the models that had
begun to be introduced in the 1850s had evolved in the subsequent decades into a
general  mechanistic world view, which was the advanced frontier of physics at the
turn  of  the  century:  strong  opposition  against  this  program  and  methodological
framework  came  from  contrasting  positions,  which  refused  the  atomic-molecular
model and referred to a substantially phenomenologi cal attitude (Mach’s Empirical
criticism, and Ostwald’s Energetics). It was to become evident that the “paradoxes”
(“ether  wind”  for  electromagnetism,  “irreversibility”  and  “recurrence”  for  kinetic
theory)  originated  only  from a forced mechanistic  interpretation  of  these physical
theories,  since  both  were  to  be  embodied  respectively  in  the  theory  of  special
relativity and in statistical mechanics.
After all, the basic contradiction of 19th century physics can be identified in the fact
that, since the adoption of  models had been acknowledged as a powerful probe to
achieve new scientific knowledge (as for instance the transcendental prediction of
electromagnetic waves), the limitation to mechanical models appears a posteriori as
contradictory  and absurd.  There  were  for  that  external  general  conditions,  which
prevented the introduction and consideration of new conceptions.
One can remark that, parallel to the mechanistic view, an electromagnetic one was
also developed, but it shared with the mechanistic one a basic reductionist attitude: in
both  the  physical  properties  were  built-up from  the  underlying  substrate  and
elementary components, be their of a mechanical or electromagnetic nature. Lorentz’
“theory of electrons” led to results physically equivalent to the subsequent theory of
special relativity: the main, but substantial, difference was that those results which in
Lorentz’ theory required complex calculations from the set of Maxwell’s equations
plus Lorentz’ law, resulted instead as straightforward consequences of the postulates
of special relativity. In fact, although Lorentz and Poincaré introduced basic concepts
of  the  subsequent  theory  of  special  relativity,  neither  of  them went  as  far  as  to
formulate a new physical theory.
We would anticipate that the new physical theories which were proposed in the early
1900s inherited aspects of both the reductionist and the phenomenological attitudes,
but  inserted  them into  a  completely  new kind  of  physical  theory  and  concept  of
natural reality (for instance, Einstein declared his debt towards Mach’s conceptions,
and it is well known the critical role of the observer in special relativity, but one could
not absolutely reduce his attitude to a positivistic one, and his theory to a Nineteenth
century one).
2.2. The mismatch between physics and chemistry at the end of the 19th century, and
the peculiarities of technological and scientific innovation in different fields. 
The  above  mentioned  contradiction  stands  even  more  out  against  the  radically
diverging attitude  adopted  by  chemists  (Baracca,  Ruffo  and Russo  1979,  Baracca
2005). Physics and chemistry had shared since the 1850s the choice of relying on
models, which had allowed a big leap, leading both disciplines to acquire a powerful
predicting and creative power, and meeting the challenges posed by a deeply renewed
wave of industrialization and technical innovation. The latter was a  process, which
had a long period of preparation during the 1850s and 1860s, and took off in the last
decades of the century, rightly called Second Industrial Revolution (Landes 1965).
This take off was centred in Germany and occurred in several fields, mainly in the
chemical  and the  electric  industries.  In  the  chemical  sector  competition  was very
strong, professional chemists and engineers were deeply involved in the development
of  the  new, highly  technological,  chemical  industry (BASF,  Bayer,  Hoechst,  etc.),
holding  roles  of  big  responsibilities,  since  the  management  of  the  firms  were
grounded on laboratories and advanced research (even through organic collaborations
with universities and polytechnics).
The  main  problems  chemists  had  to  solve  concerned  the  determination  of
equilibrium conditions for chemical reactions (above all for the new and extremely
complex organic ones). Such a problem could not even be tackled on the basis of a
reductionist-kinetic approach. The chemists were thus induced, without controversies,
to  adopt  a new scientific  approach,  based on the synthetic  and universal laws of
thermodynamics. So, in the last decades of the 19th century they developed the field of
theoretical thermodynamics,  based on the concept of “free energy”: Willard Gibbs
published in 1876 a systematic paper on the equilibrium of heterogeneous systems,
which was quite formal and complicated, while a series of more practical criteria and
laws were established which allowed to manage the problem of chemical equilibria.
In  some  sense  one  could  say  that  the  chemists  “replaced”  thermodynamics  for
mechanics as the basic framework. This choice,  under the pressure of challenging
technical scientific demands, anticipated the methodological change that was to be at
the basis of the innovations introduced at the beginning of 1900s by the physicists,
when the challenges  of new technical  requirements  and new discoveries began to
break up the reassuring reductionist world view (characteristic spectral lines, X-rays,
cathode rays, discovery of the electron, radioactivity). In the electrotechnical sector
one  of  the  main  challenges  concerned  electromagnetic  radiation.  Big  technical
improvements in the detectors of electromagnetic waves law led to the final measures
on cavity radiation at the Technische Physikalische Reichsanstalt in Berlin in the year
1900.
2.3. Planck’s peculiar role and research at the end of the Nineteenth century
Max Planck, for all his attitudes, positions and actions all along his life and career,
could hardly be classified as an “innovative” personality (see e.g.  Heilbron 1986).
Actually, his position in physics at the end of the century was peculiar, and isolated in
the scientific debate.  He did not adhere to the mechanistic approach, but opposed
Mach´s and Ostwald`s views, and moreover also Boltzmann’s statistical interpretation
of the second law (see e.g. Badino 2000), that he considered instead as an  absolute
law; he therefore did not even share the atomic model of matter. This can hardly be
qualified  as  an  advanced,  or  “revolutionary”,  although  original,  attitude.  Is  it
conceivable therefore that, shortly after, he suddenly turned into a “revolutionary”?2
Nevertheless,  we  would  assert  that  it  was  just  Planck´s  reliance  on  “absolute”
thermodynamics that allowed him to introduce an innovative approach to the black-
body problem
During the 1880s and 1890s Planck elaborated a  thermodynamic approach to the
black-body problem (see the careful reconstruction by Badino 2014; interesting also
Gearhart  2002),  based  on  the  entropy  of  a  single  resonator (in  fact,  a  concept
incompatible with the statistical nature of entropy): in fact, he adopted as a basic tool
the second derivative of the entropy of a resonator with respect to its energy.
On this  original  basis,  Planck (1900a)  finally  succeeded in  “connecting”  Wien’s
heuristic, widely accepted, law for the frequency distribution of cavity radiation to the
simplest parametrization, i.e. a direct proportionality of the second derivative of the
entropy to the energy of the resonator (see e.g. Baracca 2005, Appendix, for technical
details).
2.4.  The small  world of physics at the turn of the century,  amid deep intellectual
unrest
We deem it relevant to take into account the smallness of the world of physics at the
turn of the century, as compared to the dimension and dynamism of modern research.
The number of academic physicists in each whole country was comparable to that of
the university teaching staff of a single Department of Physics in a developed country
at present. Some numbers of academic physicists (Senior, Junior, and Privat-dozents,
and  [in  square  parenthesis]  the  total  numbers  adding  Assistants  and  Research
affiliates), in 1900 reported by Forman, Heilbron and Weart (1975, 12) are (note the
relatively  high  number  in  Germany):  Austria-Hungary,  48  [79];  U.K.,  76  [144];
France, 53 [145]; Germany, 103 [235]; Italy, 43 [73]; United States, 99 [195]. The
2 We rather agree with Krag's definition as a “reluctant” or “conservative revolutionary” (Kragh 2000).
number of scientific journals was very limited, and the new ideas were rapidly shared
by the entire physical community.
The whole intellectual environment was shaken by deep restlessness and innovative
ferments that upset the cultural and methodological horizon of the 19th century. But it
was too a very limited environment. As Janik and Toulmin (1973, p. 92) describe the
intellectual environment in Vienna:
 «It is not easy today, especially for a younger American, to recognize just how small and
tightly knit were the cultural circles of the Habsburg monarchy. [...] Mass education makes it
difficult, likewise, to conceive of a country in which there was only one real university, and
that contained pretty much in one single building; […] Thus it comes as a slight shock to
discover that Anton Bruckner gave piano lessons to Ludwig Boltzmann; that Gustav Mahler
would bring his psychological problems to Dr. Freud; that Breuer was Brentano's physician,
that the young Freud fought a duel with the young Viktor Adler, who had attended the same
high school as both the last of the Habsburgs, Charles I, and Arthur Seyssinquart, later the
Nazi Commissioner of Holland; and that Adler himself, like Schnitzler and Freud, had been
an assistant in Meynert's clinic. In short, in late Habsburg Vienna, any of the city's  cultural
leaders could make the acquaintance of any other without difficulty, and many of them
were in  fact  close friends despite  working in  quite distinct fields of  art,  thought and
public affairs.»
In  that  same  limited  environment  acted  in  those  years  persons  like  Ernst  Mach,
Schönberg, Wittgenstein, Klimt, Kokoschka.
Behind all that, the 19th century political, economic and social order was at the brink
of its disintegration (ibid., 63):
«A layer of waltz and whipped cream coverrd at the surface a desperate society … any
proportion between semblance and reality had disappeared.»
3. The multiple  take off of the (first  phase of the) “revolution” in the early
Twentieth century: the breaking of thermodynamics into physics
In  our  opinion,  Planck  and  Einstein  brought  different  and  complementary  (and
multiple)  contributions  to  the  deep  changes  in  physics  in  the  early  1900s:  which
started a process, and were in turn to be quite radically overcome in the way of the
completion of the process with the formulation of orthodox quantum mechanics.
3.1. The two 1900 Planck’s papers: a first turning point in the process of innovation
in physics, a non-mechanical thermodynamic approach.
In fact, we think that the fundamental innovation carried out by Planck in the year
1900  (already  adopted  by  him,  as  we  have  remarked,  in  the  previous  paper,  at
variance with the dominating currents in physics) was the adoption in physics of the
first non-reductionist model, properly a thermodynamic one.3
In the  first one of the two 1900 Planck’s papers on black body spectrum  (1900b),
searching for the correct law for the newly obtained experimental results, he “simply”
extended  his  previous  parameterization  (a  procedure  which  is  widely  adopted  by
physicists),  assuming  a  proportionality  of  the  second  derivative  of  the  resonator
entropy  to  a  linear  combination  of  the  first  and  second  powers  of  the  resonator
energy.4
3 Martin  Klein  (1962,  1963,  1964,  1966,  1967,  1982)  had  already  remarked  the  role  of
thermodynamics in the early papers of Planck and Einstein in the early.
4 By the way, let us insist on how the usual reconstruction of these developments in the textbooks of
physics is completely false, referring to the physical contradictions of the so-called “Rayleigh formula”
based on equipartition, which left Planck the only choice of a statistical approach a la Boltzmann. In
fact, not only in the year 1900 Rayleigh did not propose the so-called “Rayleigh formula”, but simply a
We would remark that this  step was a substantial  innovation in physics (not for
chemistry, as we have discussed, although with different purposes and features), but it
had  at  the  same time a  “conservative”  nature,  since  it  was  based  on an  absolute
interpretation of the second law, and a refusal of the atomic concepts.5
Regarding his second (and generally acknowledged) paper on his new law (Planck
1900c), we agree with those who deny that it introduced the “revolutionary” quantum
concept.6 We base this assertion on several considerations. 
In the first place, Planck definitively does not consider the “energy element” hν as a
physical quantity: in fact he explicitly writes:
«When the ratio [between the energy of the oscillators of a given frequency ν and
the “finite part”, or “energy element”, hν] is not an integer, we take for it the nearest
integer.»
Planck  considered  for  a  long  time  this  as  a  mathematical  hypothesis,  an  artefact
(Kragh 2000): the procedure of “discretization” of a continuum problem was quite
common at that time. In fact, for many years thereafter Planck was extraordinarily
reticent in ascribing any physical interpretation of these energy elements and of his
new constant h (Planck's Nobel Lecture, 1920, p. 108-109 of the transl.; Planck 1949,
p. 43-45; Planck's correspondence discussed by Gearhart 2002).
In the second place, how can one interpret the claim that in this second paper Planck
–  so  abruptly!  –  adopted  Boltzmann’s  statistical  concepts,  that  he  had  strongly
opposed till then? In our opinion things went quite differently. In his Nobel Lecture,
Planck qualified the procedure in his second paper as an «act of desperation». It is
quite different to adopt instrumentally Boltzmann’s “formalism” (moreover partially,
as we argue) for the purpose of obtaining a positive result, from adopting Boltzmann’s
“theory”: as he declared much later:
«It was a purely formal hypothesis, and I certainly did not devote much attention to
it: the only thing that interested me, at any cost, was to arrive at a positive result.»
(Planck 1931)
The more so, since “Boltzmann’s theory” was the inseparable union of the law S=k
ln W and the expression for W=N!/∏ni!. It is well known that Planck, instead, wrote
down for W a completely different expression:7 one which anticipated of 24 years the
Bose-Einstein statistics. Planck himself acknowledged that:
formal change in Wien’s heuristic law (see the detailed reconstruction of Kuhn, p. 144-52); moreover
the so-called “Rayleigh formula” was  never proposed as the physical distribution of cavity radiation
(Avila and Baracca 2006).  In 1904, when Planck’s law had been firmly experimentally confirmed,
Rayleigh considered the above mentioned formula overturning the question: why equipartition does not
apply to cavity radiation?
5 We deem however interesting to remark that in a statistical approach the second derivative of the
entropy of the resonators is directly related to their energy fluctuations (or of the correspondent natural
modes of cavity radiation). So that, curiously enough, had Planck accepted statistical mechanics (which
in fact was developed by Einstein in 1902-1904), the parametrization that he introduced in 1900 in
order to reproduce the new results for the spectrum would have implied the wave-particle duality!
Which  in  fact  was  obtained  by  Einstein  in  1909 on  the  basis  of  fluctuations  (see  Baracca  2005,
Appendix, for details).
6 By the way, we disagree on this point with the,  however careful  and rigorous, reconstruction of
Planck´s research by Badino (2012): in fact, he completely disregards the first Planck paper (1900b) in
which he derived his complete law, and this leads in our opinion to a misinterpretation of Planck´s
1900c paper.
7 As Gearhart remarks: «This expression … gives the total number of complexions, and stands in sharp
contrast to Boltzmann's procedure: Boltzmann had picked out a subset of complexions corresponding
to  a  given  macroscopic  state,  and  by  a  maximization  procedure  found  the  particular  subset
corresponding to the most probable (and hence, equilibrium) state» (Gearhart 2002, p. 202).
«In  my  opinion,  this  hypothesis  essentially  corresponds  to  a  definition  of  the
probability W» [italics are our] (Planck 1901)
Only in about 1912 Planck accepted the truly statistical  nature of the second law
(Kragh 2000).
One  more  argument  is  that,  adopting  Boltzmann’s  theory,  Planck  should  have
calculated  the  maximum value  of  W in  order  to  get  the  frequency distribution  at
equilibrium:  but  actually  he  was  satisfied  since  he  directly  got  that  «very  simple
logarithmic expression» of his previous paper that was equivalent to his new law. The
same fact justifies, in our opinion, why, at the end of the procedure, Planck did not
take the limit for hν—>0.
3.2. Einstein’s papers, 1902-1905: the decisive turns of a multifaceted “revolution”.
Our criticism of the restrictive viewpoint that underlies the concept of the Twentieth
century “revolution” in physics is reflected in circumscribing the changes to the birth
of  the  quantum concepts.  Actually,  the  deep innovations  (the  whole  “revolution”)
involved at least three basic physical disciplines, including statistical mechanics and
the theory of relativity: the physical nature of the changes introduced in the latter two
disciplines had nothing to do with the introduction of the quantum, although they
stemmed from an analogous turn in the methodological attitude, i.e. the overcoming
of a reductionist approach, and specifically the resort to (statistical) thermodynamic
reasoning.
3.3. The foundational and innovative role of statistical thermodynamics
In the first place, statistical mechanics (it should be most properly called statistical
thermodynamics)  was  not  a  straightforward  development  of  kinetic  theory,  even
substantially enriched by probability concepts. Actually, Boltzmann had introduced
practically all the basic concepts and formalisms (even statistical ensembles), but he
did  not  formulate,  not  even fully  acknowledge in  1902-1904,  a  general  statistical
theory  (Einstein  1902,  1903,  1904).  Willard  Gibbs  (1902)  formally introduced
statistical methods in mechanics as a sort of “rational thermodynamics”, without even
the claim that they had to reproduce the experimental properties, Einstein’s papers in
1902-1904 posed the foundation of a new physical theory. In which the basic role of
thermodynamics in place of mechanics is even self-evident: thermodynamic functions,
that in kinetic theory were obtained through lengthy and complex calculations of the
collisions between atoms, come out as normalization “constants” (in the phase space,
but  “functions”  of  the  macroscopic  thermodynamic  variables)  of  an  abstract
probability function. In fact, the expression of this abstract probability in the phase
space for a specific macroscopic thermodynamic condition (e.g. microcanonical, or
canonical ensemble) is such that the normalization functions are exactly the proper
thermodynamic functions (entropy, or Helmholtz free energy, respectively).  In this
framework, the “paradoxes” that had plagued the debate in physics simply vanished.8
In fact, dealing with a system of bodies, one can make two complementary choices,
excluding each other: either one can determine the exact positions and velocities of all
of them, and then  must apply Hamilton’s equations and determine their trajectories;
or,  for  any  reason,  one  has  only  an  approximate  knowledge  of  positions  and
velocities, and then must adopt the statistical formalism (see for a technical exposition
Baracca 2005, Appendix).
8 One could remark that the crisis of classical physics was implicit (latent) in the statistical meaning of
thermodynamics, and the asymmetry of time: one had “simply” to invert the roles of the “paradoxes”
and their interpretation.
By the way, it seems appropriate to remark the generality of such direct reliance on
thermodynamic laws. The latter are in fact independent from the nature and behaviour
of the underlying microscopic substrate.  In fact,  the later formulation of  quantum
statistical thermodynamics would rely on the same identical formalism of statistical
ensembles, substituting integrals in the phase space for discrete sums on microscopic
quantum states. Such generality stemmed from Einstein’s concept of thermodynamic
laws as universally valid: in their intrinsic statistical nature, not in Planck’s absolute
concept. This reinforces our thesis that Planck cannot be acknowledged as the author
of a “revolution” tout court, although he performed a first fundamental step.
Einstein’s  physical  formulation  of  statistical  thermodynamics  led  him  to
acknowledge  the  basic  role  of  fluctuations:  a  tool  which  opened  the  way  to  his
consideration of the Brownian motion in one of the 1905 papers (Einstein 1905b), and
to the skilful experiments with which Perrin finally demonstrated the physical reality
of  atoms,  opening  moreover  a  completely  field  which  was  to  have  huge
developments, that of stochastic processes.
3.4. The light-quantum as a real physical entity.
For our purpose, our basic remark is  that Einstein (1905a) ascribed, beyond any
doubt,  a  physical  reality  to  the  quantum 9.  Einstein´s  approach  confirms  his
methodological reliance on (statistical) thermodynamics, since the corpuscular light
quantum hypothesis  (against  the overwhelming evidence accumulated of the wave
nature  of  light)  was  “legitimated”  by  the  formal  analogy  of  the  logarithmic
dependence for entropy variation in an isothermal volume change in a gas and in
cavity radiation.
By the way, these fundamental papers, when they appeared were not immediately
acknowledged in the scientific environment: the first official discussion happened at
the 1011 Solvay congress, but the light-quantum was not accepted until the 1920s,
after the experiments by Compton.
3.5. One further face of the “revolution”, the theory of relativity
The third of Einstein´s papers on special relativity (1905c) inaugurated one further
face of the turns in physics, starting a long path which was to upturn our general
conception of physical reality, even in popular perception. Einstein overcame with a
single  step  the  previous  lengthy  debate  on  the  “ether  wind”,  simply  attributing  a
physical meaning to “Lorentz transformations” and assuming electromagnetism as the
intrinsically covariant theory, while he reformulated Newtonian dynamics. The 19 th
century  (Newtonian)  mechanistic  worldview was  overturned by one  step,  while  a
fourth paper (1905d) revolutionized the concepts of mass and energy.
3.6. More pieces of the puzzle.
Other deep changes, which were gradually taking shape, substantially contributed to
the radical transformation of the concept of physical reality.  One of them was the
ascertainment of the reality of atoms, and of their internal structure, which slowly
developed  in  a  completely  independent  way  of  the  new  quantum  concepts  and
problems (until 1913 the atom models were aimed to explain chemical properties).
For instance, such a basic concept as the  atomic number was not known until the
9 By the way, we refer to the Renn´s 1993 analysis, reconsidered in Büttner, Renn and Schemmel
(2003), for the reconstruction of Einsten’s choice of limiting himself in this first paper to the old Wien’s
formula for the spectrum, almost “disregarding” Planck´s law: it seems even more significant to see
how the “analogy” with the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution resulted in Einstein’s reasoning into a
new concept.
results of Moseley of 1913.
We would remark also the contribution of the improvements of the experimental
techniques in changing the concept of physical reality. As an example, the dimensions
of  the cosmos went  through  subsequent  big  steps  thanks  to  new  observing  and
measuring equipment.
The new rational and realistic – non-mechanistic, non-reductionist – worldview,
1900-1910, as the basic requirement for a physical theory
Those discussed above are in our opinion the radical innovations that all together set
up the (early) radical changes in physical theories at the beginning of the 20th century.
We want to remark that a completely new world view emerged from those changes,
completely different by the 19th century one. A world view that Einstein considered,
also in his subsequent activity, as a basic requisite to which a  physical theory (even
physical reality) must satisfy. In his view, a physical theory must describe a physical
system and its  evolution  in  space  and time.  One can recognize  such a  “realistic”
requisite at the basis of Einstein’s later criticism to Orthodox Quantum Mechanics and
the role of the observer, such as the Einsten, Podolski and Rosen paradox. In fact,
Eistein  coherently  developed  his  research  program,  widely  based  on  (statistical)
thermodynamics, which brought outstanding results, such as stimulated emission of
radiation, Bose-Einstein statistics and Einstein condensation, the quantum theory of
the ideal gas, and so on. As a matter of fact, Einstein, de Broglie, Schrödinger found
themselves increasingly isolated, since the scientific community chose a pragmatic
and formal approach. Resuming the comparison with Planck, one can remark that the
latter  explicitly  expressed  his  scepticism  towards  Einstein's  method  and  the  new
statistics (Planck 1925a, 1925b), and insisted in a formal, unjustified division by N! In
order to avoid Gibbs' paradox.
It is evident that Quantum Mechanics has subsequently abandoned this requisite of a
space-time  description.  Even  the  “revolution”  in  20th century  atomic  (quantum)
physics  was  therefore  far  from  completed  by  the  new  approaches,  besides  the
epistemological  turn,  developed  at  the  beginning  of  the  century  by  Planck  and
Einstein,  whoever  had been the  author  of  the  early  turn (we discussed  how both
contributed in different forms to this process). In this there was a further difference in
the subsequent evolution of the Theory of Relativity which, being developed mainly
by Einstein, did not break, rather considerably enriched, that realistic world view (for
these aspects we refer to Renn 2006, 2007).
What turns happened therefore after these early years? What had changed in the
1920s? Again,  we think that the substance of the process can be appreciated in  a
rational and deeper form making reference to the most general historical environment.
Even  an  outline  of  these  further  developments  goes  beyond  the  purposes  of  the
present paper. We will merely mention the basic considerations.
The collapse of the Nineteenth century world order,  and of the reliance on a
rational world view
It  was  not  only  the  ephemeral  glamour  of  the  Belle  Époque to  be  suddenly
overwhelmed by the clangour of the war. It is sufficient to compare two maps of pre-
and post-World War I Europe in order to appreciate the deepness of the collapse of a
whole  world  order:  the  big  magnificent,  however  decadent  (how  Robert  Musil’s
humour masterfully depicted what he named “Kakania”), Austro-Hungarian empire
that occupied the centre of the continent, had suddenly dissolved; the same for the
Ottoman empire; while the other big empire at the Eastern side had radically changed
its political colour.
The deep innovations introduced by the Second Industrial Revolution were finally to
irretrievably  clash  with  the  Nineteenth  century  economic  and  political  order,
accelerating  the  contradictions  and  competition  between  the  rapidly  growing
industrial societies.
However, the collapse of that world did not result in the immediate creation of a new
order, but opened the way to a long and troubled historical phase of deep instability,
which  lasted,  with  dramatic  developments,  during  the  whole  inter-war  period
(actually, Hobsbawm interprets these two decades as an entire war period).
The subversion of the world order had to reflect in the world view, in mentality, in
the cultural and philosophical foundations, as well as in the role of scientists and their
specific production.10 As Arnold Sommerfeld eloquently remarked in one of the most
prestigious of the South German monthlies:
«The belief in a rational world order was shaken by the way the war ended and the
peace  dictated;  consequently  one  seeks  salvation  in  an  irrational  world  order.»
(Sommerfeld, 1927)
The crisis upset every social activity and expression. Direct reference to the object
of  (artistic  or  scientific)  interest,  got  into  deep  crisis,  with  the  very  substance  of
human existence, in the tormented and desperate conception of human existence in
Expressionism,  as  well  as  in  the  developments  of  philosophical  thought.  The
rationality  of  human  behaviour  was  subverted  by  Freud’s  unconscious.  All  that
reflected in the artistic expressions, in the deconstruction of the object; Schönberg
upset the rules and concepts of classical harmony.
It is difficult not to see a parallel with the turn in Physics. Paul Forman (1971) has
developed an extremely detailed and careful reconstruction of the cultural factors that
underlined the choices at the basis of the formulation of Quantum mechanics, making
reference  also  to  the  changes  in  the  organization  and  promotion  of  science  in
Germany.  We think however that a  complete analysis  should be rooted in a more
general  consideration  of  the  economic  and  social  contradictions  in  the  Twenties,
mainly in Germany (early outlines for such an analysis were laid by Baracca, Livi and
Ruffo 1979-80, Donini 1982; very interesting also Rohrlich 1992, von Meyenn 1992,
1994).  The  tormented  history  of  the  Weimar  Republic  was  the  melting  pot  of
innovative and contrasting experiences, the clash of rational (Rathenau, the Bauhaus,
only as examples) and irrational approaches, which finally resulted in the 1929 crash.
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  new generation  of  physicists  who formulated  Quantum
Mechanics rejected any reference to the description in space and time of the state of
the system and its evolution, conceiving the description of atomic systems as a mere
correlation among their possible states,  which could not be further specified.  This
point  of  view  turned  out  to  be  incompatible  with  the  previous  view  we  have
discussed: behind the incompatibility of the physical structures and consequences, the
respective authors held since the beginning opposite concepts about what reality is,
and what science describes. Heisenberg wrote to Pauli: “The more I weigh up the
physical part of Schrödinger’s theory, the more horrible it appears to me”; while to
10 About Planck's social positions, one should recall that at the outset of the war he endorsed the 1914
Manifesto  of  the  Ninety-Three  German  Intellectuals  to  the  Civilized  World
(http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Manifesto_of_the_Ninety-Three_German_Intellectuals),  although
together with other scientists, such as Felix Klein, Haber, Nernst (the two had directed the creation of
the German chemical stockpile), Ostwald, Rõntgen, Wien.
Schrödinger, Heisenberg’s theory “Made me depressed” (about Schrödinger see Renn
2013). We deem it remarkable that the material and ideological climate in postwar
Britain was different (De Maria and La Teana 1982): 
“Dirac was much less disposed than his German colleagues to abandon a spatial-temporal
description of microscopic phenomena, and he struggled to construct  the new Quantum
Mechanics as a  generalization of (and not only a break with) classical physics, through a
systematic utilization of the classical Hamilton formalism.”
Many considerations  could  be  added on this  new radical  turn in  physics  in  the
1920s, which brought to a completion the Twentieth century “revolution” in atomic
physics, but we will not further lengthen in this draft. We will just add some further
suggestions related to the more general connections of this turning point, without any
aim of systematic nature.
Generally  speaking,  the  problem  of  controlling  the  increasing  instability  at  an
economic and social  level  (monetary chaos,  inflation,  overproduction crisis,  social
disorder, etc.), which contrasted with the previous view of an inexhaustible pace of
economic growth, posed the need of more flexible and effective control tools. The
shift from a rigid organization of labour and production towards an organization based
on the statistical correlation of an increasing flux of products and goods (including the
labour force), led to the adoption of the “Scientific Organization of Labour”, aimed
precisely at the coordination, correlation and control of multiple, unpredictable factors
(Devinat, 1927). The most exact among natural sciences was the most suitable for
subsuming and formalizing such goals, and succeeded in incorporating them into a
formal structure.
It  is interesting to remark how Quantum Mechanics has constituted the basis for
subsequent scientific developments. The aftermaths of the 1929 crash reinforced the
necessity for a full flexibility of productive and technological innovation. The birth
and proliferation of specialized scientific disciplines in the United States in the 1930s
supported a continuous differentiation of productive sectors and output, avoiding the
accumulation of overproduction crises. In this new situation also the role of scientists
and their conceptions and activities changed (one must recall also the brain drain of
German scientists): it could no longer consist in providing general representations of
the world, but rather the most flexible frame of reference, such that it did not limit,
but rather stimulate free developments and practical solutions. Quantum Mechanics
had in some sense anticipated and embodied these needs, and presented itself as the
ideal  framework for  these developments:  it  provided that  context  and criterion of
control  and  validation  on  proliferating  scientific  developments  which  had  been
provided  in  previous  phases  respectively  by  mechanism-reductionism,  and  by  the
realistic  space-time  description.  It  was  a  formal basis  instead  of  a  substantial or
realistic one,  but  it  was  just  what  was  needed.  We  deem  it  very  interesting  the
methodological  analogies  that  have  been  remarked (Cini  1985,  Montagnini  1999-
2000)  with  Norbert  Wiener’s  information  theory,  in  which  information  too  is
considered and formalized independently from its specific content and meaning, and
the convergence between Wiener’s and von Neumann’s views.
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